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Abstract: Physical contact and respiratory droplet transmission have been widely regarded as the
main routes of COVID-19 infection. However, mounting evidence has unveiled the risk of aerosol
transmission of the virus. Whereas caution has been taken to avoid this risk in association with
clinical facilities, facilities such as spa pools and Jacuzzis, which are characterized by bubble-aerosol
generation, high bather loads, and limited turnover rates, may promote aerosol transmission. Focus-
ing on these non-clinical facilities in the built environment, a review study was undertaken. First, the
typical water disinfection and ventilation-aided operations for the facilities were illustrated. Second,
cross comparisons were made between the applicable standards and guidelines of the World Health
Organization and countries including Australia, Canada, China, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The similarities and differences in their water quality specifications, ventilation requirements,
and air quality enhancement measures were identified; there were no specific regulations for prevent-
ing aerosol transmission at those aerosol-generating facilities. Third, a qualitative review of research
publications revealed the emergence of studies on potential air-borne transmission of COVID-19,
but research on built facilities posing high risks of aerosol transmission remains scant. This study’s
results inform key directions for future research on abating aerosol transmission of COVID-19: the
development of bespoke personal protective equipment and engineering and management controls
on water quality, ventilation, and air quality.
Keywords: aerosol; air quality; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; ventilation; water quality
1. Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has triggered a world-wide pandemic, causing
over 2.3 million deaths [1]. COVID-19 transmissibility, as reflected by its reproductive
number, 2.87 [2], is much higher than influenza and other, similar types of human coro-
navirus [3,4]. Moreover, genetic mutations of the virus may further boost the infectious
risk [5–8].
At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, physical contact with pathogen carriers
and droplet transmission were generally regarded as the dominant paths for transmitting
COVID-19. However, mounting evidence suggests that other transmission paths have
become apparent. In a hospital in Wuhan, China, researchers found that the concentration
of SARS-CoV-2-RNA-laden aerosol was exceptionally high in crowded gathering places
and poorly ventilated areas used by infected persons (e.g., toilet areas: 19 copies/m3, main
entrance: 11 copies/m3), although negligible concentrations were found in most patient ar-
eas that are designed with negative pressurization and high air exchange rates [9]. Another
study in Singapore found a much higher concentration of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the airborne
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infection isolation rooms (AIIRs), which ranged from 1.84 × 103 to 3.38 × 103 copies/m3
air sampled with particle sizes larger than 1 µm [10].
In mid-2020, around 240 scientists from 32 countries wrote an open letter to the
World Health Organization (WHO) arguing that there was growing evidence for the
spread of COVID-19 through opportunistic airborne transmission, especially in indoor
environments with certain special uses (e.g., otorhinolaryngologic procedures) [11,12].
Around the same time, the National Health Commission, the State Administration of
Traditional Chinese Medicine, and the WHO acknowledged the possibility of aerosol
transmission in some indoor environments (e.g., due to insufficient ventilation, high
aerosol concentrations) [13,14].
In the healthcare sector, the risk of COVID-19 transmission associated with aerosols
generated from clinical facilities has been well-recognized. Therefore, caution has been
taken to address this risk. In non-clinical areas of the built environment, facilities such as
spa pools and Jacuzzis, which are characterized by bubble-aerosol generation, high bather
loads, and limited turnover rates, may also promote aerosol-borne COVID-19 transmission.
However, studies on such facilities are limited.
To contribute to the understanding of information or research outcomes that are con-
ducive to mitigating the risk of COVID-19 transmission via non-clinical aerosol-generating
facilities, this present study conducted a literature review of relevant national/international
standards, leading professional guidelines, and top-notch research publications. Based
upon the review findings, directions for future research were identified.
2. Methods and Materials
To facilitate a contemporary review of information on both the practice and research
sides of this dynamic and critical public health issue, a series of search and review pro-
cesses were implemented: namely, (i) Stage I—general search, (ii) Stage II—refined search,
(iii) Stage III—screening, and (iv) Stage IV—snowball review. In Stage I, keywords includ-
ing “COVID-19”, “SARS-CoV-2”, “aerosol”, and “pool” were used in multi-combinations
for sourcing the relevant literature (between 2000 and 2020) in Scopus, ScienceDirect, and
Web of Science. This resulted in a total of 4750 publications, of which 77.4 percent were
from Scopus, 19.2 percent from ScienceDirect, and 3.4 percent from Web of Science. Consid-
ering the abundance of such literature, a refined search was conducted in Stage II. In this
stage, keywords including “COVID-19”, “aerosol”, and “pool” were used in combination
and, because COVID-19 emerged in 2019, the articles covered were from 2019 up to the
moment when the search process was implemented. Because the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) was also due to coronavirus, a further series of searches were performed
using the keywords “SARS”, “aerosol”, and “pool”. Hence, approximately 1000 articles
were identified. In Stage III, these articles were screened manually for their relevance by
scrutinizing their titles, abstracts, and content. In Stage IV, articles accordingly found to
be relevant were used to snowball the initial sample frame using the reference list within
each publication to identify other relevant publications for inclusion in the review process.
As some limitations existed in the review process—for example, some guidelines and
standards may not have been considered as literature in the above-mentioned databases—a
complementary search was conducted to fill the search gap for aerosol-rich facilities and
virus spread containment measures and acquire relevant publications from the WHO and
renowned professional institutions in countries including Australia, Canada, China, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
3. Aerosol Transmission and Aerosol-Rich Facilities
3.1. Mechanism of Aerosol Transmission
Aerosol transmission is a key factor in severe epidemics [15]. Aerosols can be con-
sidered as tiny droplets (also referred to as “droplet nuclei” or “respirable droplets”) that
may reach the susceptible lower respiratory tract without being trapped by mucus or
cilia. Compared to aerosols, droplets are large particles that can be generated by close
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expiratory events and may eventually deposit onto mucous membranes [16]. Any human
expiratory events (i.e., coughing, sneezing, laughing, talking, breathing, etc.) may generate
both droplets and aerosols, whereas the latter is more prevalent [17]. Droplet transmis-
sion is a short-range path with gravitational settlement within a short duration, typically
within seconds [16,18], whereas aerosols, due to their long suspension times (e.g., 8 to
10 min for droplet nuclei of 4 µm) in stagnant air environments [19], are transmitted over
long-range paths.
Aerosols can contain traces of SARS-CoV-2, which survive longer than other respi-
ratory viruses and remain viable and infectious for 3 h [20,21]. The medical industry has
been alerted to aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., the use of 3-way syringes in dental
settings, intubation during surgeries and endoscopy) [22,23]. To effectively reduce infection
probability, scholars also considered the importance of ventilation rate and air distribution
pattern on top of social distancing to reduce human exposure to aerosols [24,25]. Mathe-
matical models indicated that quintupling the standard ventilation could gradually reduce
the infection rate while doubling the ventilation rate could delay the infection peak to more
than two times the original period [26].
3.2. Aerosol-Rich Facilities
Although some researchers had highlighted the importance of building engineering
controls to reduce indoor aerosol transmission in public buildings and public transport
facilities [27], strategic aerosol control measures for indoor aerosol-generating facilities
have received limited attention. In fact, spa pools and similar facilities (such as hot tubs
and whirlpools) for recreational, wellness, or therapeutic purposes are not only found on
private premises (e.g., club houses) but also are prevalent in venues of the health, tourism,
and leisure sector, which is a USD 100 billion market [28]. Facility users are exposed to
high concentrations of the aerosols generated.
A spa pool involves an air injection system that generates air and water bubbles to
produce a relaxing sensation against human skin. Due to the difference in density, bubble
films (i.e., air bubbles) originating from water turbulence will rise to the water surface
and then burst into film droplets and jet droplets above the water surface (see Figure 1).
Jet droplets differed in size in the range of 100 µm, whereas bubbles with diameters of
several millimeters could produce film droplets with diameters ranging mostly from 2 µm
to 10 µm. These film droplets constitute aerosols that can be inhaled into the lung’s alveolar
region [29–31].
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Figure 1. Formation of film droplets and jet droplets.
Although standard maintenance and operation (e.g., adequate free chlorine level and
frequent cleaning) may prevent water contamination, virus-containing aerosols generated
by any expiratory events of carriers or infected persons may trigger cross-contamination of
the aerosols in the confined space. During the use of spa pools, general precautions (e.g.,
wearing a mask, social distancing, and pre-bath hygiene) cannot be taken to avoid direct
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exposure to high aerosol-related microbiological risk. Unlike general pool facilities, spa
pools are characterized by high temperatures, large surface area to volume ratios, high
bather density, more biofilms, and long usage periods; a confined setting may further in-
crease the concentration of contaminated aerosols, against which standard water treatment
is not a panacea [32].
An outbreak of COVID-19 in a public bath center in Huai’an, China infected at least
eight individuals and may have been related to aerosol transmission [33,34]. Another
outbreak, occurring on the Diamond Princess cruise ship, indicated a high possibility of
passenger-to-passenger-dominated transmission in a confined setting. Note that the first
infected person in this outbreak had used spa pools. Studies also found that the overall
mean reproduction number (R0) reached up to 11 before any enhanced quarantine controls
were implemented in this case [34]; preliminary findings showed that airborne transmission
was the main route to the outbreak on the cruise ship [35,36].
3.3. Virus Spread Containment Measures
3.3.1. Water Disinfection
A proper water treatment system safeguards users against contaminated water. It is a
robust process involving multiple stages of treatment (see Figure 2): (1) filtration—removal
of suspended impurities and small particles by filters; (2) ozone disinfection—a secondary
treatment to alter the chemical structure of water contaminants such as impurities and dis-
infect by-products (e.g., chloramines, trihalomethane [THM] precursors) through oxidation
effects; (3) ultraviolet (UV) radiation—another secondary treatment to induce mutagenic
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) lesions to inactivate various types of pathogens (e.g., CoV,
MRSA) [37,38]; and (4) chemical dosing—using chemicals (e.g., chlorine) to provide further
instant disinfection and ongoing disinfection.
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With the disinfection afforded by a water treatment system, inevitably formed aerosols
(i.e., film droplets) above the water surface have no pathogens to attach to. However,
biofilms and contaminated materials arising from facility users (e.g., hair, fat, fecal release,
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urine, sweat, nasal secretions, saliva, mucus, and skin flakes) are resistant to the disinfection
effectiveness. Moreover, spa pools are usually designed with complicated and concealed
small pipe systems, which facilitates the formation of biofilms [39]. Reportedly, germs
under the protection of biofilms cannot be killed under standard chlorine levels [32].
COVID-19 might also potentially spread through fecal-oral transmission in recreational
water as COVID-19 fragments detected in fecal matter could survive in water for up to
10 days [40,41]. Until now, there has been limited evidence that COVID-19 can spread
through water sources [42]; water subject to robust water treatment does not appear
favorable for the survival of COVID-19.
To monitor both the effectiveness of the disinfection facilities and water quality of
pool facilities, different parameters such as free residual chlorine, pH value, total bacteria
count, Escherichia coli level, and turbidity have been established. Public health authorities,
including the WHO and those in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, the U.K., and the U.S.,
have published guidelines on health protection for use of spa pools (Table 1). These
guidelines cover three key issues, namely, water quality, sampling frequency, and operation
and maintenance.
Pool water quality significantly depends on the level of free chlorine and pH value.
While almost all the above guidelines follow the WHO’s recommendations (i.e., mini-
mum of 2 ppm for free chlorine and a pH value between 7.2 and 7.8), some regions (e.g.,
Hong Kong, the U.K., the U.S.) have their own guidelines, allowing up to 5 ppm free
chlorine for better disinfection against high bather load. Other water-balancing parameters
(for those specified), such as total alkalinity used to prevent pH fluctuation and calcium
hardness used to avoid corrosion or scaling, fall within the ranges of 60–200 mg/mL and
75–800 mg/mL, respectively. Most of the guidelines cover parameters of microbiological
quality, such as total bacteria count and level of E. coli. In contrast, only some specific
guidelines provide recommended limits on bacteria including Pseudomonas Aeruginosa,
Legionella, and Staphylococcus Aureus. In addition to the above parameters, requirements
on pertaining to operation and maintenance activities (e.g., regular draining and routine
backwashing) are also given.
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(min) 5–20 Not Specified 20–30 Not Specified 6–15 Not Specified
Free chlorine (ppm) 2–3 (Twice daily) 3–5 (Twice daily) ≥3 (Five times daily(i)) 2–5 (Hourly)
3–5 (Daily at opening
and every two hours
thereafter)
1.5 (Class A Pool);





(ppm) ideally <0.2 ≤1 (Twice daily)
≤1, ideally <0.2 (Five
times daily) ≤0.4 (Hourly) ≤1 (Ditto) ≤0.5 (Ditto)
Water balance
pH value 7.2–7.8 (Several times aday) 7.2–7.8 (Twice daily)
7.2–7.8 (Five times
daily) 7.2–7.8 (Twice daily) 7.0–7.6 (Ditto) 7.2–7.8 (Ditto)
Total alkalinity
(mg/L) Not specified 80–200 (Not specified) 80–120 (Weekly) 60–180 (Once daily) Not specified
80–120 (Weekly, Class




(mg/L) Not specified 75–150 (Not specified)
Not specified
(Weekly) 100–800 (Once daily) Not specified 200–300 (Weekly)
Total bacteria count
(CFU/mL) Not specified ≤200 (Monthly) ≤100 (Monthly) ≤200 (Not specified) <100 (Monthly) <250 (Not specified)
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be done after the last




Notes: (i) Queensland Government allows “once-daily” sampling for pool facilities with automated monitoring; (ii) Water replacement interval (WRI) = (0.33) × (Spa volume in gallons)/(Number of bathers per
day since last change); (iii) “Class A Pool” and “Class B Pool” are defined in R.R.O. 1990, REGULATION 565, Health Protection and Promotion Act.
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3.3.2. Ventilation-Aided Operation
In indoor venues with spa pools or similar facilities, generated aerosols could accu-
mulate, although mechanical ventilation could help remove such aerosols. Recommended
ventilation requirements for spa pools or similar facilities in Australia, China, Hong Kong,
the U.K., and the U.S. are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Ventilation requirements for spa pools or similar facilities.






































































The standard published by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) requires the same ventilation requirement for swim-
ming pools to be applicable to spa pools, while the standards of the U.K. and Australia
impose a higher ventilation requirement (i.e., 10 L/s/m2) on spa pools. Comparatively,
the California Mechanical Code 2016 provides more ventilation requirements, namely:
negative pressure, minimum outdoor air provision, and total indoor air change, but these
are mainly for hospital hydrotherapy settings. Hong Kong’s Guidelines stipulate a high air
exchange rate for spa pools but a minimum for outdoor air exchange is not specified. In
China, the GB standard sets limits on indoor CO2 concentration and microbiological indoor
air quality as ventilation controls for public facilities, which cover public bath centers.
A universal standard of ventilation requirements for spa pools was not found from
the above review. In places where the recommended ventilation rates are set with a
range of values, facility owners or operators may select a low ventilation rate or even the
lowest limit to minimize energy consumption. By virtue of technological advancement,
some engineering systems such as regenerative energy conservation and demand control
ventilation have been developed to further reduce energy consumption [43]. However, the
resultant decrease in ventilation may weaken the effectiveness of infection control during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Professional institutions including the ASHRAE, the Indian Society of Heating, Re-
frigerating & Air Conditioning Engineers (ISHRAE), the Chartered Institution of Building
Services Engineers (CIBSE), the International Facility Management Association (IFMA),
and the China Property Management Institute (CPMI) have published guidelines for guard-
ing against COVID-19. To minimize the growth of germs or accumulation of virus-carrying
aerosols, the measures recommended for strengthening indoor air quality or ventilation
are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3. Measures for strengthening indoor air quality or ventilation.
Measure

















CPMI: Technical Guidelines for
the Operation Management of
Air-conditioning Ventilation
System in Public Buildings
During the COVID-19 Epidemic
1. Increase outdoor air rate 4 4 4 4 4 4
2. Bypass energy recovery
ventilation system with
potential air leakage
4 4 4 4 - 4
3. Provide full fresh air
supply (No use of
recirculated air)
4
(For quarantine areas and
COVID-19 patient area and
industrial facilities)
4 4 4 4
4. Upgrade central air
filtration to MERV-13 or
higher
4 4 - - 4 4





(Fresh air and ventilation
system should be kept on
throughout the off cycle and
on the weekend and
holidays in air circulation
mode)
4
(Start ventilation at nominal speed at least 2 h before the
building usage time and switch to lower speed 2 h after the
building usage time; keep the ventilation on 24/7 with
lower ventilation rates when people are absent)
4
4
(Start the AC system 1 or 2 h
before the building usage time)
6. Consider the use of
portable room air cleaners
with HEPA filters
4 - 4 4 - -
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Table 3. Cont.
Measure






















System in Public Buildings
During the COVID-19
Epidemic





such as waiting rooms,
prisons, and shelters)
4
(For larger ducted units
and AHUs)
4



























4 - Change CO2 setpoint to lower, 400 ppm value, inorder to maintain the operation at nominal speed - -
Remark: For details of the above recommendations, please refer to the respective guidelines.
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While the focuses of concern of the aforementioned six institutions belong to two
disciplines, namely, engineering and management, they share common recommendations
on the following measures: increase outdoor air rate and extend operating hours of heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. Other common measures recommended
by most of the engineering institutions are to bypass the energy recovery ventilation system
with potential air leakage; consider the use of ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI);
consider the use of portable room air cleaners with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
filters; and disable/adjust demand-control ventilation. On the management side, the IFMA
and the CPMI both offer the following two recommendations: upgrade central air filtration
to MERV-13 or higher; and replace filters/clean and disinfect HVAC coils.
The six institutions vary in their specific recommendations regarding extended hours
of HVAC system operation and the adoption of temperature and humidity controls. For
the former measure, for instance, the ASHRAE and the ISHRAE recommend operating the
HVAC system on a 24/7 basis; the REHVA and the CIBSE recommend, inter alia, full-speed
operation at least 2 h before building usage time and low-speed operation 2 h after building
usage time; and the CPMI recommends starting the AC system 1 or 2 h before building
usage time.
The above professional institutions’ guidelines, which are specific for tackling COVID-
19, may serve as reference in operating aerosol-rich facilities such as spa pools and instal-
lations. Because experience in applying these guidelines to indoor venues should be of
reference value, it is worth investigating whether there are difficulties in implementing
the recommended measures, and whether the measures are effective [44]. Consider the
first recommended measure in Table 3 as an example—is it practicable to increase the
outdoor air rate of an existing ventilation system? Caution should be exercised because
the air duct size and fan capacity of such existing systems, which were fixed when the
systems were installed, might not be fit for delivering extra amounts of outdoor air. Even if
this is made possible by modifying the existing system, how much in additional system
operating costs will be incurred? To what level can the inhalational exposure to airborne
coronavirus be reduced? Such measures could have a ripple effect, leading to many more
technical questions, not to mention environmental, financial and management issues (e.g.,
an increase in energy consumption stemming from the increase in the outdoor air rate). In
addition, not all of the recommendations of the six institutions are identical; the reasons
for their differences as well as any scientific grounds for the recommended settings also
warrant future investigations.
4. Recent Research Efforts
Since the emergence of COVID-19, the research community has made various efforts
to obtain findings that are conducive to the prevention, suppression, and/or elimination
of the disease. In addition to the drive to identify the ways in which the virus is spread
and new variants evolve, as reported below, research has been actively undertaken to
investigate the critical factors of COVID-19 transmission and control and certification
measures while battling the virus.
4.1. Spread and New Variants
According to the review of Morawska et al. [27], air samples taken from hospitals in
Singapore, the U.S., and China revealed that aerosols could contain traces of SARS-CoV-2.
COVID-19 ribonucleic acid (RNA) copies per liter of air vary within a range between 0.02
and 4.1. Through literature searches in various publication databases, Amoah et al. [45]
found that virus-bearing aerosols may be formed during the transport of wastewater,
which is a hotbed for COVID-19. Nevertheless, the signature refrain among health protec-
tion agencies (e.g., WHO) has been to call for more in-depth research to investigate this
phenomenon in greater detail [46].
Using tracer gas testing, computational fluid dynamics simulations, and quantitative
reverse transcription PCR (RT-qPCR) for the surface and air samples collected from a high-
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rise apartment building in Guangzhou, China, Kang et al. [47] recognized the circumstantial
evidence supporting the spread of virus-containing fecal aerosols along the vertical stack.
Through a mega-data analysis of viral genome sequences, various new variants (i.e.,
multiple spike protein mutations) were identified. N501Y mutations, which dominated
the rapid surge of infection cases in the U.K., were preliminarily more transmissible than
previously circulating strains, with an estimated potential to increase the reproduction
number (R0) by 0.4 or greater [48].
4.2. Critical Factors
Through a literature search, Morawska and Cao [49] identified that sampling chal-
lenges and knowledge gaps between microbiologists and building scientists are major
obstacles to achieving a global consensus amid the inherently false “droplet-borne versus
airborne” dichotomy. In addition, the review research of Megahed and Ghoneim [50]
identified insights of post-coronavirus architecture and urbanism: decentralization, urban
farming, multi-modal transport, modular construction, hygienic building materials, artifi-
cial intelligence, and touchless technologies. By analyzing the counter-measures suggested
in ventilation and air-conditioning-related guidelines, Guo et al. [51] pinpointed that the
maximization of outdoor air flow, extension of ventilation systems, and portable room air
cleaners were the common strategies to mitigate COVID-19 transmission.
Using correlation and regression analysis, Anthony Aroul Raj et al. [52] studied the
dependence of mortality and infection rates in various Indian states with respect to climatic
data. Findings revealed strong correlations between infection rates, air-conditioning usage,
dry conditions, etc., as droplets exhaled from the human body may undergo size reductions
through heat and mass transfer to colder, drier surrounding air and linger in the air for
longer periods.
Using statistical analysis with the Riley model, Sun and Zhai [24] found that stay/
exposure time, occupant density, and ventilation rates are key factors for low infection
probability. Using CFD simulation, Leng et al. [53] analyzed geometric design parameters
for the development of courtyards to ensure airborne disease control. If courtyard width
varied from 5.8 m to 11.8 m, the average air pollutant concentration decreased by 80%.
Whereas person-to-person pollutant exposure was found infeasible, passive building
designs may be an alternative.
4.3. Control and Certification
Using an agent-based SEIIR model, Zhang et al. [54] analyzed the efficiency of different
intervention strategies to prevent infection by the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Shenzhen, China.
Whereas the existing control measures (e.g., quarantining arrivals and work stoppages)
could not be deemed a panacea, the risk of infection could have been reduced by 50% if
all symptomatic individuals had immediately gone to hospital for isolation, and 35% if a
14-day quarantine for arrivals from Hubei Province had been introduced one week earlier.
Using a tracer gas measurement test, Xu et al. [55] analyzed the effectiveness of person-
alized ventilation in protecting against airborne disease transmission between occupants.
Under high clean air volumes, this air delivery system may be effective in disease control
within indoor environments.
As certification can help guarantee that facilities have high ventilation rates and
adequate occupancy, Blocken et al. [56] suggested implementation of an aerosol exposure-
related certificate for sports centers, settings where users are exposed to a high risk of
infection due to intensive inhalation.
5. Future Research Directions
Amid the fight against COVID-19, researchers in the scientific community have been
unfailingly devoted to studying how the disease can be avoided, including investigating
its transmission mechanisms. However, the above illustrates that research on COVID-19
transmission associated with aerosol-rich facilities such as spa pools remains scant.
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With reference to the hierarchy of controls of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC), a multi-pronged strategy comprising six aspects of controls (Figure 3) could
be adopted to combat COVID-19 [44]. Undoubtedly, prevention is better than cure, and
elimination and substitution are effective means of control to remove or replace the hazard
(i.e., the coronavirus). This reduces the risk of infection and contains the risk of community
outbreak, thus alleviating the pressure exerted upon the public healthcare system.
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Among the COVID-19 preventive measures are vaccines. Although vaccines have
been developed for combating the coronavirus, a full picture of their effectiveness was
unavailable at the time of this writing. Even if the vaccines are highly effective, vaccination
does not always confer full immunity to virus infection. Further, because proven medicine
for curing COVID-19 patients remains unavailable while elimination and substitution of
the hazard are not guaranteed, continued effort should be made to pursue the remaining
control strategies.
Social distancing, a notable example of administrative control, has been widely en-
forced by governments across the world since the COVID-19 outbreak. However, such
control measures, which restrain personal freedom and undermine the economy, are often
unwelcome. Therefore, further effort should be made to explore the control strategies in the
remaining three aspects: (a) personal protective equipment (PPE); (b) engineering control;
and (c) management control.
For PPE, facial masks have become a daily necessity for most people during the
COVID-19 pandemic. However, special masks or respirators should be developed for users
of facilities such as spa pools. Besides the effectiveness of shielding virus transmission and
cost considerations, a prime objective for such devices should be that their use does not
jeopardize users’ enjoyment of spa pools.
For engineering control, research should be focused on the water treatment systems
and mechanical ventilation systems for spa pools and similar facilities alike. Many ques-
tions need to be addressed by research studies on these issues. Consider the water treatment
process as an example—can the typical water treatment mechanism effectively kill viruses
before they attach to the aerosols generated from a burst of water bubbles? Are there
any secondary treatment systems other than using ozone or UV? Are the water quality
requirements in Table 1 sufficient for controlling COVID-19 transmission? Does the same
question apply to the issues of ventilation and air quality (Tables 2 and 3)?
For research on management control, multiple questions again present themselves.
For instance, are the existing preventive maintenance measures sufficient for assuring the
hygiene of spa pools or similar facilities? Are the recommended measures on air quality
(Table 3) sufficient for controlling COVID-19 transmission, especially for the prevention of
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aerosol exposure? In implementing such measures, are any challenges posed, for example,
by building restrictions, cost constraints, or user requirements?
Applicable to the above three aspects (i.e., PPE, engineering control, and management
control), development and application of innovative or smart technologies that enable
automatic sensing, monitoring, and control functions for fighting against the spread of
COVID-19 should also engender future research directions. Such technologies reside
under the broad banner of Industry 4.0 and may include, for example, sensor-based
networks to connect individual electronic sensors together to gather real-time data on a
building’s internal environment; the internet of things (IoT), to upload big data gathered
from sensors to virtual servers that have greater and more-expedient computational power
than local desktop computers; artificial intelligence to analyze and interpret data acquired
to inform decision support and knowledge management within an organization; and
augmented or virtual reality to visualize the internal environment, identify any problem
areas, and communicate the results of analysis in a visually stimulating and accessible
manner (cf. [57,58]). These technologies therefore have the innate capability to coalesce
to provide automated systems that can continuously monitor and control an internal
environment with precision (cf. [59]). As credible certification schemes for virus-free
facilities can further give confidence to users of the facilities, research on the establishment
and implementation of such schemes is also recommended.
6. Conclusions
Through a review of contemporary standards, guidelines, and research publications
about COVID-19 and aerosol-rich facilities in the built environment, the findings of this
study outlined aerosol transmission mechanisms and identified useful measures for con-
taining the spread of the virus. Comparisons made between the standards and guidelines
of the WHO and those applied within Australia, Canada, China, the United Kingdom, and
the United States revealed similarities and differences in water quality specifications, venti-
lation requirements, and air quality enhancement measures. Such observations warrant
that the differences be further investigated on scientific grounds.
A further significant observation from our review was that no specific regulations
have been imposed to prevent aerosol transmission in facilities such as spa pools and
Jacuzzis, which pose high risks of aerosol transmission. Studies on this topic remain
limited, although research on potential air-borne transmission of COVID-19 has notably
increased. Therefore, more research effort should be focused on investigating how the
transmission of COVID-19 in such aerosol-rich facilities can be mitigated.
Combating COVID-19 entails a multi-pronged strategy that comprises hazard elimina-
tion, hazard substitution, the use of PPE, administrative control, engineering control, and
management control. The results of this review suggest that apart from the administrative
controls of governments and continuing efforts to develop medications for hazard elim-
ination or substitution purposes, the remaining elements of the strategy require further
in-depth study. Such future research will help to abate aerosol transmission of COVID-19
in our built environment and include (1) the development of bespoke PPE; (2) engineering
control over water quality, ventilation, and air quality; and (3) management control (also
over water quality, ventilation, and air quality).
Despite the above findings, our review study was not without limitations. First, the
standards and guidelines reviewed were confined to those of the WHO and the countries
we reviewed. In the future, similar review studies may be conducted with an extended
scope of review, covering standards and guidelines in other countries internationally to
gain a far broader perspective. Second, the reviewed journal articles were limited to those
indexed in three major literature databases. Whereas these databases are renowned for
their wide coverage of credentialed publications, efforts may be made in future studies to
identify any useful literature that has not been included in the above review. In conclusion,
this study reviewed and compared a disparate range of existing literature to foster wider
debate and future "targeted" research investigations. The current pandemic has revealed
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weaknesses in current provisions to protect the health and well-being of the general public
and national economies; such future investigations will be instrumental to the longer-term
health and prosperity of the international community.
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